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Introduction
Legal confusion has clouded the recent de facto
change of government in Honduras. Some of this
arises from the passionate political debate over
President Manuel Zelaya and his de facto removal.
Without entering that debate, this analysis addresses
only questions of international law and related
questions of law.
In the early morning hours of Sunday, June 28, 2009,
acting on a judicial warrant to arrest President Zelaya
for alleged crimes, the nation’s military stormed the
presidential palace, and arrested the chief executive
in his pajamas. Then, exceeding its warrant, and in
violation of an express provision of the Honduran
Constitution,[1] (/print/170#_edn1) the military put the
pajama-clad president on a plane to Costa Rica.[2]
(/print/170#_edn1) With Zelaya involuntarily exiled,
the Honduran Congress met that afternoon, listened
to a reading of a supposed letter of resignation from
him, and promptly accepted it.[3] (/print/170#_edn1)
The Congress then issued a decree purporting to
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depose Zelaya on other grounds, and to replace him
by the president of the Congress, Rigoberto
Micheletti.[4] (/print/170#_edn1)
President Zelaya’s removal and replacement were
swiftly denounced as a coup d’état by governments
throughout the region,[5] (/print/170#_edn1) including
by U.S. President Obama,[6] (/print/170#_edn1) and
by the United Nations General Assembly,[7] (/print
/170#_edn1) the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights,[8] (/print/170#_edn1) and the General
Assembly of the Organization of American States
(OAS).[9] (/print/170#_edn1) Invoking the InterAmerican Democratic Charter,[10] (/print/170#_edn1)
the OAS General Assembly termed the coup an
“unconstitutional alteration of the democratic
order,”[11] (/print/170#_edn1) thus triggering the
suspension of Honduras from participation in the
OAS.[12] (/print/170#_edn1)
Although the United States joined in the 33-0 OAS
vote,[13] (/print/170#_edn1) the Obama
Administration stopped short of deeming Zelaya’s
ouster a “military coup,” which would trigger a
statutorily mandated suspension of U.S. intergovernmental foreign assistance to Honduras.[14]
(/print/170#_edn1) Nonetheless, the Administration
suspended military and inter-governmental
development aid as a matter of policy.[15] (/print
/170#_edn1) At least one witness at a congressional
hearing went further, calling Zelaya’s removal a
“military coup” requiring an aid suspension.[16] (/print
/170#_edn1)
By contrast, the removal and replacement of Zelaya
were vigorously defended by a broad, if not
unanimous,[17] (/print/170#_edn1) array of Honduran
civil authorities – including all 15 members of the
Supreme Court,[18] (/print/170#_edn1) the chief
prosecutor,[19] (/print/170#_edn1) an overwhelming
majority of Congress,[20] (/print/170#_edn1) and the
new, de facto government.[21] (/print/170#_edn1) In
written communiqués, they insisted that his ouster
was a lawful and constitutional action to defend
Honduran democracy and the rule of law from a
president who had defied both courts and
Constitution, and who was maneuvering to amend the
Constitution to allow him to run for a second term.[22]
(/print/170#_edn1) Similar views have been
expressed by a number of members of the U.S.
Congress.[23] (/print/170#_edn1)
On the day he was deposed, President Zelaya, in
violation of a court order, was attempting to conduct
a referendum on whether to call a constitutional
convention.[24] (/print/170#_edn1) His arrest that
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morning was pursuant to a judicial warrant from a
civilian court,[25] (/print/170#_edn1) for alleged
crimes against the form of government, treason,
abuse of authority and usurpation of functions.[26]
(/print/170#_edn1) The person later selected by
Congress to replace him – the president of the
Congress – followed the constitutionally mandated
line of succession.[27] (/print/170#_edn1) Civilian
authorities remained in office after Zelaya’s removal.
The courts, the Congress, and the autonomous
agencies, such as the chief prosecutor and the
human rights ombudsman, all continued operating
normally. The only change in the government seems
to have been the removal of Zelaya and members of
his Administration, and their replacement by a new,
civilian president and his team.
If this was a military coup, it bore little resemblance
to the classic overthrow of civilian authorities by
colonels and generals, followed by the rule of a
military junta or caudillo, which has so marred Latin
American history.[28] (/print/170#_edn1) But was it
nonetheless a coup d’état? There was an odd
omission in the after-the-fact official communiqués:
they did not even address whether the Honduran
Constitution empowers Congress to remove a
president in these circumstances. They made no
reference to Zelaya’s supposed letter of resignation.
They did not so much as cite the congressional
decree purporting to oust him.[29] (/print/170#_edn1)
Defenders of the change of government later
attempted to fill the void by citing a supposedly “selfexecuting” provision of the Constitution.[30] (/print
/170#_edn1) Article 239 provides that any official
who proposes to reform the Constitution, in order to
allow a president to run for a second term,
“immediately” ceases in the exercise of his office.[31]
(/print/170#_edn1) Reading the Constitution to
effectuate a “self-executing” removal of a president,
however, with no prior hearing or procedure, and no
specification of who decides on the removal, or on
what evidentiary basis, would offend elemental
concepts of due process of law.[32] (/print
/170#_edn1) In any event, this proposed justification
was ex post facto: the congressional decree ousting
Zelaya cited numerous provisions of the Constitution,
but Article 239 was not among them.
In short, after being forced out of the country in
breach of the Constitution, President Zelaya was
formally deposed by a Congress with no clear
constitutional power to remove him in the
circumstances at hand, let alone summarily, without
so much as a hint of due process of law. This was
indeed a coup d’état (even if the relative degrees of
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responsibility of the civilian and military authorities for
the coup remain unclear).
Unconstitutional Alteration of the Democratic
Order
On September 11, 2001, the OAS General Assembly
unanimously adopted the Inter-American Democratic
Charter.[33] (/print/170#_edn1) Although the
Democratic Charter is not a treaty, it may be viewed
as an authoritative interpretation of the OAS
Charter[34] (/print/170#_edn1) by the parties to that
treaty, and thus to have binding legal effect.[35]
(/print/170#_edn1)
Article 9 of the OAS Charter authorizes the General
Assembly to suspend a member state from
participation in the OAS when its “democratically
constituted government has been overthrown by
force.” If that were the only applicable norm, the
Honduras case would be debatable: although
President Zelaya was forcibly taken out of the
country, and forcibly prevented from returning,[36]
(/print/170#_edn1) his formal removal from office and
replacement were accomplished peacefully in
Congress.
The Democratic Charter, however, goes further.
Article 20 authorizes a special session of the OAS
General Assembly whenever there is an
“unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional
regime that seriously impairs the democratic order in
a member state.” If initial diplomatic efforts fail, Article
21 authorizes the General Assembly to suspend a
member state from participating in the OAS if there
has been an “unconstitutional interruption of the
democratic order.”
This poses a challenge for international lawyers.
Ordinarily international law imposes its own,
autonomous norms for the permissible conduct of a
government. Questions of domestic law – including
constitutionality – are left to domestic authorities,
both as a matter of their sovereign entitlements, and
because they are presumed better able to interpret
their own constitution.
The Democratic Charter is an exception. In order to
create a collective regional safeguard for democracy
in each country, it sets international standards which
demand (among other things) that each nation comply
with its own constitution. To the extent that
democracy depends on constitutionalism, this
incorporation of domestic law into international law is
unavoidable.
But this requires international lawyers – and other
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OAS member states – to consider whether domestic
authorities have breached their own constitution, in
order to evaluate whether they meet their
international commitments. This task should be
undertaken with humility and respect for domestic
expertise. But it cannot be avoided, lest de facto
regimes be given carte blanche to fabricate their
constitutionality. On close questions of constitutional
law, deference should be paid to domestic
authorities. But where the breach is clear and its
effect undemocratic, the international whistle must be
blown.[37] (/print/170#_edn1)
In the Honduran case, several elements combine to
make out a clear case of unconstitutionality. First
was the forced expatriation of President Zelaya, an
action whose constitutionality – in the face of an
express constitutional prohibition of expatriation[38]
(/print/170#_edn1) – has few if any defenders.[39]
(/print/170#_edn1)
Second was the immediate congressional
acceptance of his purported letter of “resignation” –
when it was known that he had been forcibly exiled to
Costa Rica that very morning. President Zelaya
promptly denied writing the letter, and the U.S. State
Department publicly doubted its authenticity.[40]
(/print/170#_edn1) Perhaps reflecting doubts, the
congressional decree deposing Zelaya makes no
mention of his “resignation.” Nor do the subsequent
official communiqués. The “resignation” now appears
to have been nothing more than an embarrassing
ploy.
Third is the evident lack of congressional power to
depose Zelaya in the circumstances. With one
exception, none of the constitutional articles cited by
the congressional decree purport to grant Congress
power to remove or replace a president.
The first four articles cited by Congress – Articles 1-4
– do not even mention Congress, let alone grant it
any powers. Article 1 provides that Honduras is a
democratic state under the rule of law.[41] (/print
/170#_edn1) Article 2 states that usurpation of
powers is treason,[42] (/print/170#_edn1) while
Article 4 provides that alternation in the presidency is
obligatory and that violation of that norm constitutes
treason.[43] (/print/170#_edn1)
But a determination of whether or not Zelaya
committed treason is a matter for the Honduran
Supreme Court, not Congress. Unlike common law
constitutions, the Honduran Constitution does not
provide for impeachment and trial of a president by
the legislature.[44] (/print/170#_edn1) Instead, the
Honduran Constitution mandates that the case be
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adjudicated by the Supreme Court, not by
Congress.[45] (/print/170#_edn1)
Article 3 of the Constitution provides that no one
need obey a government which engages in
usurpation or uses unconstitutional means; its
actions are null, and the people have a right to
engage in insurrection.[46] (/print/170#_edn1) But
insurrection is a right of the people, not a power of
Congress. And the people of Honduras – as shown
by the large crowds who came to the airport in the
capital in order to try to welcome President Zelaya
home[47] (/print/170#_edn1) – are clearly divided in
their sympathies.
Article 205, paragraph 20, gives Congress power to
“approve or disapprove” administrative conduct,[48]
(/print/170#_edn1) while Article 218 bars the
president from vetoing certain legislation, including
bills that refer to the conduct of the executive.[49]
(/print/170#_edn1) Neither article says anything
about removal. Articles 321-23 are general
provisions providing that no official is above the law,
and that they take an oath to obey the law.[50] (/print
/170#_edn1) None purports to empower Congress to
do anything, much less to remove and replace a
president.
The only article invoked by the decree that grants
Congress a relevant power is Article 242.[51] (/print
/170#_edn1) It empowers Congress to replace an
absent president whose absence or incapacity is
permanent or indefinite.[52] (/print/170#_edn1) But
Congress well knew that Zelaya’s absence was
involuntary, and that he wanted to return immediately.
To force a president out of the country in violation of
the Constitution, to deny him reentry, and then to
replace him on the ground that he is “absent,”
illustrates the sort of constitutional chicanery the
Inter-American Democratic Charter is designed to
condemn.[53] (/print/170#_edn1)
Defenders of the de facto government later invoked a
different provision to justify the removal of President
Zelaya.[54] (/print/170#_edn1) Article 239 provides
that anyone who proposes to reform the
constitutional ban on re-election of a president, and
those who help him, “will cease immediately in the
exercise of their respective positions.”[55] (/print
/170#_edn1) But to treat this provision as “selfexecuting” is problematic. For example, if President
Zelaya violated Article 239, when did he cease to be
president? Months ago, when he openly began to
advocate a constitutional reform to allow his
re-election?[56] (/print/170#_edn1) And who is to
say? Do the courts decide? Does the Congress?
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What if they disagree? What if the president disputes
their accusation? What is the evidentiary standard?
How and when does Honduras know that it no longer
has a lawfully elected president? Plainly Article 239 is
unworkable without some procedure to implement it.
And in any case, Article 239 was not the basis on
which Congress purported to depose Zelaya.
A fourth flaw in the removal of the president was the
absence of due process of law. Under the American
Convention on Human Rights,[57] (/print/170#_edn1)
to which Honduras is a party,[58] (/print/170#_edn1)
and which under the Honduran Constitution prevails
over domestic law,[59] (/print/170#_edn1) high
officials are entitled to due process of law before
being removed from office.[60] (/print/170#_edn1)
Not only does President Zelaya enjoy this right as a
matter of fairness to him, but the voters who elected
him also have a right not to be deprived of the fruits
of their electoral victory, without some reasonable
process for removal.
The Honduran Congress chose not to await the
outcome of the only constitutional remedy – a
criminal trial before the Supreme Court.[61] (/print
/170#_edn1) Instead, it summarily removed the
president without so much as a hearing. If interpreted
as self-executing, Article 239 would do the same.
Either avenue of summary removal is inconsistent
with Honduras’ treaty obligations, violative of due
process of law, and anti-democratic.
Conclusion
Despite the condemnation of the coup d’état by the
United Nations, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, and the OAS, and by many
governments including the United States, and despite
suspension of Honduras from receipt of U.S. and
European aid,[62] (/print/170#_edn1) and from
participation in the OAS, diplomatic efforts to return
President Zelaya to Honduras have not succeeded
as of the date of this writing.[63] (/print/170#_edn1)
Most recently, the U.S. has revoked the diplomatic
visas of four persons associated with the de facto
regime, and has many more visas under review.[64]
(/print/170#_edn1) As diplomatic efforts and political
debates continue, at least the threshold legal
question should be put to rest: the purported removal
and replacement of President Zelaya were, in the
words of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, an
“unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order.”
Whatever one’s views of the president and his prior
conduct, the June 28 coup was an assault on
constitutional order. If allowed to stand, it will become
a menacing precedent for democracy, not only in

2/10/2014 8:49 AM

Honduras: Coup d’Etat in Constitutional ...

8 of 19

http://www.asil.org/print/170

Honduras, but throughout the hemisphere.
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Endnotes
[1] (/print/170#_ednref1) Constitución de la República
de Honduras, art. 102 (“Ningún hondureño podrá ser
expatriado ni entregado por las autoridades a un
Estado extranjero”) [hereinafter “Constitution”].
Unofficial translation: “No Honduran can be
expatriated or delivered by the authorities to a
foreign State.” (This and all other translations of the
Constitution in this essay are unofficial translations
by the author).
[2] (/print/170#_ednref2) William Booth & Juan
Forero, Honduran Military Ousts President; Zelaya
Flown to Costa Rica; Congress Votes Him Out,
Names Successor, WASH. POST, June 29, 2009, at
A1.
[3] (/print/170#_ednref3) Congreso destituye a
Manuel Zelaya, LA TRIBUNA, June 29, 2009,
available at http://www.latribuna.hn/web2.0/?p=14265
(http://www.latribuna.hn/web2.0/?p=14265) [1] (last
visited July 26, 2009).
[4] (/print/170#_ednref4) Decreto de Destitución de
Zelaya, June 28, 2009, reprinted in id. The author
has not found a copy of the decree on the Honduran
Congress website, and relies on the text (subject to
one obvious correction in note 48 infra) as published
in LA TRIBUNA.
[5] (/print/170#_ednref5) See, e.g., WASH. POST,
supra note 2.
[6] (/print/170#_ednref6) Remarks by President
Obama and President Uribe of Colombia in Joint
Press Availability, June 29, 2009 (President Obama
remarked: “We believe that the coup was not legal
and that President Zelaya remains the President of
Honduras, the democratically elected President
there”), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov
/the_press_office/Remarks-by-President-Obama
-and-President-Uribe-of-Colombia-in-Joint-Press-
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[9] (/print/170#_ednref8) AG/RES. 1 (XXXVII-E/09)
(July 1, 2009), 37th Sess., OEA/Ser.P/XXXVII-E/09
(2009), ¶1.
[10] (/print/170#_ednref8) Inter-American Democratic
Charter, AG/RES. 1 (XXVIII-E/01), Sept. 11, 2001,
arts. 20 (“unconstitutional alteration of the
constitutional regime that seriously impairs the
democratic order”) and 21 (“unconstitutional
interruption of the democratic order”) [hereinafter
“Democratic Charter”].
[11] (/print/170#_ednref8) AG/RES. 1, supra note 9,
¶ 1; AG/RES. 2 (XXXVII-E/09) (July 4, 2009), 37th
Sess., OEA/Ser.P/ XXXVII-E/09 (2009), (first
preamb. paragraph).
[12] (/print/170#_ednref8) Id. (invoking art. 21 of the
Democratic Charter).
[13] (/print/170#_ednref8) U.S. Dept. of State,
Background Briefing on the Organization of
American States Decision on Honduras, July 5,
2009, available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs
/ps/2009/july/125638.htm (http://www.state.gov
/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/july/125638.htm) [3] (last visited July
26, 2009).
[14] (/print/170#_ednref8) Department of State,
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Appropriations Act, 2009 (division J of the Omnibus
Appropriations Act, 2009; P.L. 111-8; 123 Stat. 524
at 831), § 7008.
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/july/125757.htm (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs
/dpb/2009/july/125757.htm) [4] (last visited July 26,
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Olson, Exec. Dir., Washington Office in Latin
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America) [hereinafter “House Hearing”].
[17] (/print/170#_ednref8) Some officials opposed or
did not fully endorse the coup. The human rights
ombudsman proposed a national plebiscite on
whether to restore President Zelaya to office.
Comisionado Nacional de los Derechos Humanos de
la República de Honduras, Propuesta Para Legitimar
el Ejercicio de la Soberanía Nacional y Del Principio
de Autodeterminación de Pueblos, July 1, 2009,
available at www.conadeh.hn
(http://www.conadeh.hn/) [5] (last visited July 26,
2009). Unofficial translation: “Proposal to Legitimize
the National Sovereignty and the Principle
[18] (/print/170#_ednref8) Corte Suprema de
Justicia, Comunicado Especial, June 30, 2009; and
Comunicado del 20 de Julio, July 20, 2009; both
available at www.poderjudicial.gob.hn
(http://www.poderjudicial.gob.hn/) [6] (last visited July
26, 2009).
[19] (/print/170#_ednref8) Ministerio Público,
Comunicado, June 30, 2009, ¶ 3, available at
www.mp.hn (http://www.mp.hn/) [7] (last visited June
26, 2009)
[20] (/print/170#_ednref8) The vote in Congress on
June 28 to depose President Zelaya was reportedly
“by unanimity.” Congreso destituye a Manuel Zelaya,
LA TRIBUNA, June 29, 2009. At least one member of
Congress, however, left the session before the vote
because she objected to the entire proceeding. See
No Hubo Contundencia en Elementos Para
Improbar la Conducta de Zelaya, LA TRIBUNA, July
2, 2009 (Congresswoman Elvia Argentina Valle). Both
articles are available at www.latribuna.hn
(http://www.latribuna.hn/) [8] (last visited July 26,
2009).
[21] (/print/170#_ednref8) Secretaría de Relaciones
Exteriores, Boletín Informativo, June 29, 2009,
available at www.sre.hn (http://www.sre.hn/) [9] (last
visited July 26, 2009).
[22] (/print/170#_ednref8) Even some who recognize
the purported deposing of President Zelaya as a
coup d’etat, nonetheless fear that he was leading the
country down the path taken by Bolivia, Ecuador and
Venezuela, “where elected presidents have
spearheaded processes of constitutional reform that
erode checks and balances, strengthen the power of
the executive branch and create alternative
participatory mechanisms for the exercise of
so-called ‘popular democracy.’" House Hearing,
supra note 16 (testimony of Cynthia Arnson, Director
of the Latin America Program at the Woodrow Wilson
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International Center for Scholars).
[23] (/print/170#_ednref8) See generally House
Hearings, supra note 16.
[24] (/print/170#_ednref8) Corte Suprema de
Justicia, Comunicado Especial, supra note 18. The
referendum would have asked, “¿Está de acuerdo
que en las elecciones generales del 2009 se instale
una Cuarta Urna en la cual el pueblo decida la
convocatoria una Asamblea Nacional
Constituyente?” Unofficial translation: “Do you agree
that in the 2009 general elections there should be
installed a fourth ballot box in which the people can
decide on the convening of a National Constituent
Assembly?” El Presidente de la República en
Consejo de Ministros, Decreto Ejecutivo
PCM-005-2009, LA GACETA, June 25, 2009, art. 1.
[25] (/print/170#_ednref8) Fuerzas Armadas de
Honduras, Comunicado de Prensa No. 1, 30 de
Junio de 2009, ¶¶ 3 & 5, available at
www.ffaah.mil.hn (http://www.ffaah.mil.hn/) [10] (last
visited July 26, 2009); Corte Suprema de Justicia,
Comunicado Especial, supra note 18, ¶ 6.
[26] (/print/170#_ednref8) Comunicado, supra note
19, ¶ 2 (“delitos contra la forma del gobierno, abuso
de autoridad, traición a la patria y usurpación de
funciones”).
[27] (/print/170#_ednref8) Constitution, supra note 1,
art. 242.
[28] (/print/170#_ednref8) On July 24 – by which time
it was clear that diplomatic negotiations were
intended to return President Zelaya to the country
and to the exercise of his office – the Armed Forces
publicly “reaffirmed” their subordination to civil
authority and their “strict respect” for the outcome of
the negotiations. Fuerzas Armadas de Honduras,
Comunicado No. 7, July 24, 2009, available at
www.ffaah.mil.hn (http://www.ffaah.mil.hn/) [10] (last
visited July 26, 2009).
[29] (/print/170#_ednref8) See communiqués in supra
notes 18, 19 & 21.
[30] (/print/170#_ednref8) House Hearings, supra
note 16, (witness Lanny Davis).
[31] (/print/170#_ednref8) For text, see infra note 55.
[32] (/print/170#_ednref8) See Constitutional Court v.
Peru, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 71, ¶¶
81-85, 110 (Jan. 31, 2001) (constitutional court
judges may not be removed without due process of
law).
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together with the context: (a) any subsequent
agreement between the parties regarding the
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provisions. . . .” The Democratic Charter is such a
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OAS Charter. Its last preambular paragraph bears in
mind “the progressive development of international
law and the advisability of clarifying the provisions
set forth in the OAS Charter and related basic
instruments on the preservation and defense of
democratic institutions, according to established
practice . . . .” Cf. Interpretation of the American
Declaration, Adv. Op. OC-10/89, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) No. 10, ¶¶ 43, 45 & 47 (July 14, 1989)
(American Declaration, as an “authoritative
interpretation” of the OAS Charter, has “legal effect”
and is a source of “international obligations”).
[36] (/print/170#_ednref8) Marc Lacey & Ginger
Thompson, Honduras is Rattled as Leader Tries
Return, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2009, at A4.
[37] (/print/170#_ednref8) Cf. Sunday Times v. United
Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 245, ¶59 (1979)
(national authorities are granted a “margin of
appreciation” in complying with the norms of the
European Convention on Human Rights, but subject
to a “European supervision”).
[38] (/print/170#_ednref8) Constitution, supra note 1,
art. 102.
[39] (/print/170#_ednref8) On July 4, 2009, the Chief
Prosecutor of Honduras, who earlier filed criminal
charges against President Zelaya and who publicly
supported the coup, announced that he was
conducting an investigation to determine, among
other things, whether “Manuel Zelaya” was well
treated after his arrest and “the circumstances that
led to his departure toward Costa Rica.” Ministerio
Público, Comunicado, 4 de Julio de 2009, available
at www.mp.hn (http://www.mp.hn/) [7] (last visited July
26, 2009).
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[40] (/print/170#_ednref8) WASH. POST, supra note
2.
[41] (/print/170#_ednref8) Constitution, supra note 1,
art. 1: “Honduras es un Estado de derecho,
soberano, constituido como república libre,
democrática e independiente para asegurar a sus
habitantes el goce de la justicia, la libertad, la cultura
y el bienestar económico y social.” Unofficial
translation: Honduras is a state under law, sovereign,
constituted as a free, democratic and independent
republic, in order to ensure its inhabitants the
enjoyment of justice, liberty, culture and economic
and social well-being.”
[42] (/print/170#_ednref8) Id. art. 2: “La soberanía
corresponde al pueblo del cual emanan todos los
poderes del Estado que se ejercen por
representación. La suplantación de la soberanía
popular y la usurpación de los poderes constituidos
se tipifican como delitos de traición a la Patria. La
responsabilidad en estos casos es imprescriptible y
podrá ser deducida de oficio o a petición de
cualquier ciudadano.” Unofficial translation:
“Sovereignty belongs to the people, from whom
emanate all the powers of the State, which are
exercised by representation. The supplanting of
popular sovereignty and usurpation of the powers
conferred constitute the crimes of treason of treason
against the Nation. There is no statute of limitations
for these crimes and criminal proceedings can be
initiated by public authority or by petition of any
citizen.”
[43] (/print/170#_ednref8) Id. art. 4: “La forma de
gobierno es republicana, democrática y
representativa. Se ejerce por tres poderes:
Legislativo, Ejecutivo y Judicial, complementarios e
independientes y sin relaciones de subordinación. La
alternabilidad en el ejercicio de la Presidencia de la
República es obligatoria. La infracción de esta norma
constituye delito de traición a la Patria.” Unofficial
translation: “The form of government is republican,
democratic and representative. It is carried out by
three powers: Legislative, Executive and Judicial,
which are complementary and independent and none
is subordinate to another. Alternation in the exercise
of the Presidency of the Republic is obligatory.
Violation of this norm constitutes treason against the
Nation.”
[44] (/print/170#_ednref8) Until 2003, art. 205 (15) of
the Constitution empowered Congress to “[d]eclarar
si ha lugar o no a formación de causa contra el
Presidente. . . .” Unofficial translation: “[t]o declare
whether or not there are grounds to bring a case
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against the President . . .” In 2003, this provision was
repealed. See Decreto 175-2003, Nov. 28, 2003, art.
1, published in LA GACETA, Dec. 19, 2003, A2,
available at http://www.congreso.gob.hn
/constituciones/DECRETO%20175-2003.pdf
(http://www.congreso.gob.hn/constituciones
/DECRETO%20175-2003.pdf) [11] (last visited Aug.
18, 2009).
[45] (/print/170#_ednref8) Constitution, art. 319: “La
Corte Suprema de Justicia, tendrá las atribuciones
siguientes: . . . 2. Conocer de los procesos incoados
a los más altos funcionarios del Estado …” Unofficial
translation: “The Supreme Court of Justice shall have
the following powers: . . . 2. To adjudicate charges
brought against the highest officials of the State . . . .”
(as amended by Decreto 175-2003, Nov. 28, 2003,
art. 2, published in LA GACETA, Dec. 19, 2003, A2,
available at http://www.congreso.gob.hn
/constituciones/DECRETO%20175-2003.pdf
(http://www.congreso.gob.hn/constituciones
/DECRETO%20175-2003.pdf) [11] (last visited Aug.
18, 2009)).
[46] (/print/170#_ednref8) Constitution, art. 3: “Nadie
debe obediencia a un gobierno usurpador ni a
quienes asuman funciones o empleos públicos por la
fuerza de las armas o usando medios o
procedimientos que quebranten o desconozcan lo
que esta Constitución y las leyes establecen. Los
actos verificados por tales autoridades son nulos. El
pueblo tiene derecho a recurrir a la insurrección en
defensa del orden constitucional.” Unofficial
translation: “No one owes obedience to a
government which usurps, nor to those who assume
public functions or employment by force of arms or by
using means or procedures which violate or disregard
those established by this Constitution and the laws.
Acts certified by such authorities are null. The people
have the right to resort to insurrection in defense of
the constitutional order.”
[47] (/print/170#_ednref8) See Lacey & Thompson,
supra note 36.
[48] (/print/170#_ednref8) Constitution, supra note 1,
art. 205: “Corresponden al Congreso Nacional las
atribuciones siguientes: . . . 20. Aprobar o improbar
la conducta administrativa del Poder Ejecutivo, Poder
Judicial y del Tribunal Nacional de Elecciones,
Contraloría General de la República, Procuraduría
General de la República e instituciones
descentralizadas; . . . .” Unofficial translation: “The
National Congress has the following powers: . . . 20.
To approve or disapprove the administrative conduct
of the Executive Power, Judicial Power and the
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National Electoral Tribunal, the Comptroller General
of the Republic, the Attorney General of the Republic
and decentralized institutions. . . .” (The version of
the congressional decree reported in LA TRIBUNA
refers to article 205, and then to article 220(20).
Article 220 does not have subsection 20, but article
205 does. I accordingly treat the reference as being
to article 205(20)).
[49] (/print/170#_ednref8) Id. art. 218: “No será
necesaria la sanción, ni el Poder Ejecutivo podrá
poner el veto en los casos y resoluciones siguientes:
1. En las elecciones que el Congreso Nacional haga
o declare, o en las renuncias que admita o rechace;
2. En las declaraciones de haber o no lugar a
formación de causa; 3. En los decretos que se
refieren a la conducta del Poder Ejecutivo;. . .”
Unofficial translation: “No sanction will be necessary,
nor can the Executive Power exercise the veto in the
following cases and resolutions: 1. In the elections
which the National Congress makes or declares, or in
the resignations which it accepts or rejects; 2. In the
declarations that there is or is not ground to bring a
case; 3. In the decrees which refer to the conduct of
the Executive Power . . . .”
[50] (/print/170#_ednref8) Id. art. 321: “Los
servidores del Estado no tiene más facultades que
las que expresamente les confiere la ley. Todo acto
que ejecuten fuera de la ley es nulo e implica
responsabilidad.” Unofficial translation: “Public
servants have no more powers than those which are
expressly conferred upon them by law. Any act which
they undertake outside the law is null and implies
responsibility.” Art. 322: “Todo funcionario público al
tomar posesión de su cargo prestará la siguiente
promesa de ley: ‘Prometo ser fiel a la República,
cumplir y hacer cumplir la Constitución y las leyes.’”
Unofficial translation: “Every public official upon
assuming office will make the following promise under
law: ‘I promise to be faithful to the Republic, to obey
and to enforce the Constitution and the laws.’” Art.
323: “Los funcionarios son depositarios de la
autoridad, responsables legalmente por su conducta
oficial, sujetos a la ley y jamás superiores a ella.
Ningún funcionario o empleado, civil o militar, está
obligado a cumplir órdenes ilegales o que impliquen la
comisión de delito.” Unofficial translation: “Public
officials are granted authority, are legally responsible
for their official conduct, and are subject to the law
and never above it. No official or employee, civilian
or military, is obligated to follow orders which are
illegal or which imply the commission of a crime.”
[51] (/print/170#_ednref8) Id. art. 242: “Si la falta del
Presidente fuere absoluta, el Designado que elija al
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efecto el Congreso Nacional ejercerá el Poder
Ejecutivo por el tiempo que falte para terminar el
período constitucional. Pero si también faltaren de
modo absoluto los tres designados, el Poder
Ejecutivo será ejercido por el Presidente del
Congreso Nacional,. . . por el tiempo que faltare para
terminar el período constitucional. En sus ausencias
temporales, el Presidente podrá llamar a uno de los
designados para que lo sustituya. ...”
Unofficial translation (see infra note 52): “If the
absence or incapacity of the President were
permanent or indefinite, the Designee selected for
that purpose by the National Congress will exercise
the Executive Power for the time that remains until
the end of the constitutional term of office. But if
three designees are also permanently or indefinitely
absent or incapacitated, the Executive Power will be
exercised by the President of the National Congress,.
. . for the time that remains until the end of the
constitutional term of office. During his temporary
absences, the President may call on one of the
designees to replace him . . . .”
[52] (/print/170#_ednref8) The Spanish text refers to
a “falta . . . absoluta.” In this context the word “falta”
refers at least to an “absence,” and perhaps to an
incapacity as well. (The immediately preceding
article, Art. 241, provides that the president may not
[seems that there is a verb missing here] himself from
national territory for more than 15 days without
congressional permission). In English “falta absoluta”
would literally translate to an “absolute absence or
incapacity,” which makes little sense. The better
translation, I believe, is a “permanent or indefinite”
absence or incapacity.
[53] (/print/170#_ednref8) The author has found no
subsequent official defender of the removal of
President Zelaya who justifies it on this ground.
[54] (/print/170#_ednref8) See, e.g., House Hearing,
supra note 16 (testimony of Lanny Davis).
[55] (/print/170#_ednref8) Constitution, supra note 1,
art. 239: “El ciudadano que haya desempeñado la
titularidad del Poder Ejecutivo no podrá ser
Presidente o Designado. El que quebrante esta
disposición o proponga su reforma, así como
aquellos que lo apoyen directa o indirectamente,
cesarán de inmediato en el desempeño de sus
respectivos cargos, y quedarán inhabilitados por diez
años para el ejercicio de toda función pública.”
Unofficial translation: “The citizen who has been the
Chief of the Executive Power cannot [again] be
President or Designee. Anyone who breaches this
provision or proposes its reform, as well as those
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who assist him directly or indirectly, shall cease
immediately in the discharge of their respective
posts, and will remain ineligible for ten years for the
exercise of any public function.”
[56] (/print/170#_ednref8) See, e.g., President
Wants Voters to Let Him Seek New Term, TORONTO
STAR , Mar. 25, 2009, at A20 (“President Manuel
Zelaya called yesterday for a June referendum on
changing the constitution to let him run for a second
term”).
[57] (/print/170#_ednref8) American Convention on
Human Rights, 22 Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123,
reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970).
[58] (/print/170#_ednref8) Honduras ratified the
Convention on Sept. 5, 1977. See Convention
ratification table at http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos
/English/Basic4.Amer.Conv.Ratif.htm
(http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English
/Basic4.Amer.Conv.Ratif.htm) [12] (last visited July 26,
2009).
[59] (/print/170#_ednref8) Constitution, supra note 1,
art. 16 reads: “. . . Los tratados internacionales
celebrados por Honduras con otros estados, una vez
que entran en vigor, forman parte del derecho
interno.” Unofficial translation: “International treaties
celebrated by Honduras with other status, once they
enter into force, form part of domestic law.” Art. 18
adds: “En caso de conflicto entre el tratado o
convención y la Ley prevalecerá el primero.”
Unofficial translation: “In case of conflict between a
treaty or convention and the law, the former will
prevail.”
[60] (/print/170#_ednref8) See Constitutional Court v.
Peru, supra note 32.
[61] (/print/170#_ednref8) At least one member of
Congress objected that this procedure was not
followed, instead of the decree deposing President
Zelaya. See No hubo Contundencia en Elementos
Para Improbar la Conducta de Zelaya, LA TRIBUNA,
July 2, 2009 (Congresswoman Elvia Argentina Valle),
available at www.latribuna.hn
(http://www.latribuna.hn/) [8] (last visited July 26,
2009).
[62] (/print/170#_ednref8) Press Release 12255/09,
Council of the European Union, Declaration by the
Presidency on Behalf of the European Union on the
Political Situation in Honduras (July 21, 2009),
available at http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles
/en/article_8897_en.htm (http://www.europaeu-un.org/articles/en/article_8897_en.htm) [13].
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[63] (/print/170#_ednref8) On July 25, 2009, the
Honduran military issued a communiqué which,
according to a New York Times report, was the “first
sign of support for the San Jose Accord – by which
President Zelaya would return as president, but with
limits on his powers, and with the date of the next
elections moved up – by a powerful sector of the de
facto government.” Ginger Thompson & Blake
Schmidt, Military in Honduras Backs Plan on Zelaya,
N. Y. TIMES, July 26, 2009, at A12; see Fuerzas
Armadas de Honduras, Comunicado No. 7, July 24,
2009, available at www.ffaah.mil.hn (file:///Z:
/IT/old%20work%20files/insights/www.ffaah.mil.hn)
[14] (last visited July 26, 2009).
[64] (/print/170#_ednref8) U.S. Dept. of State, Daily
Press Briefing, July 28, 2009, available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2009
/july/126589.htm#honsuras (http://www.state.gov
/r/pa/prs/dpb/2009/july/126589.htm#honsuras) [15]
(last visited July 29, 2009). The four visas revoked to
date reportedly include those of the judge who issued
the warrant to arrest President Zelaya, the current
president of the Congress, the Human Rights
Ombudsman and the head of the armed forces. Marc
Lacey, Honduras: Officials’ Diplomatic Visas
Revoked, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2009, at A6; “Esta
decision nos deja un saldo positivo,” LA TRIBUNA,
June 29, 2009, available at
Organizations of Note:
United Nations (http://www.un.org/en/) [16]
Organization of American States
(http://www.oas.org/) [17]
Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(http://www.corteidh.or.cr
/index.cfm?CFID=54495&CFTOKEN=16234367)
[18]

National Congress of Honduras (Congreso
Nacional de Honduras) (http://congreso.gob.hn
/index.html) [19]
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